MOVI sample letter to Secretary of State Alex Padilla:
Email to: VotingSystems@sos.ca.gov
SUBJECT Comments on VSAP 2.0
Dear Secretary of State Alex Padilla,
I am deeply concerned that the new voting system for Los Angeles County could be certified given that testers have discovered more than 40 very serious violations of California Voting System Standards, including findings that reveal:
The VSAP system can be booted from a USB drive that would bypass all security and logging protections and that access to the master account is needed for too many things, meaning that "too many people have access to the root password," according to state testers. That means "The excessive root access and the ability to boot the system from a USB port give access to the system by unauthorized individuals. Either scenario can result in undetected changes to files and data...Both scenarios can allow functions to be executed in non-intended ways. The unrestricted access to, and the ability to boot from, the USB port allows access to voting data";
Many problems were discovered with security regarding encryption and cryptography in the new system;
The testers discovered "It is possible to insert or remove ballots from both the BMD and ballot transfer boxes without detection";
"The printer cover allows access to the ballot box and can be opened without detection";
"Seals, locks, labels and sensors can all be bypassed" without detection.
The security issues with this machine NEED to be fixed first. Please do not certify this system unless every security detail has been rectified.
The solution is to require a HAND-MARKED paper ballot for all voters at the polling place in this year's crucial primary and general elections. International standards and election security experts all agree that hand marked paper ballots are the best way to prevent election fraud and know that every vote is counted as cast.
Also extremely disturbing is this latest experiment by election security expert J. Alex Halderman and his students at the University of Michigan that demonstrates that 90% of errors by BMDs go undiscovered by the voter.
Lastly, this system is continually touted as being open source, so please put the code online. To claim that it is open source and then never publish the code is not open or transparent and misleading to the public.